Normative Indeterminacy in the Epistemic Domain by Leonard, Nicholas & Cariani, Fabrizio
Normative indeterminacy in the epistemic
domain
Nick Leonard and Fabrizio Cariani
 Introduction
This paper is about epistemic conflicts in which one is doomed to violate a rule
of rationality no matter what. Here is one example, lifted from Leonard ():
logic problem: Anna is a logic student who is evaluating the fol-
lowing proposition:
(L) If Lenny is happy if and only if Jenny and Benny are not happy,
then if Jenny is happy if Benny is not, Lenny is not happy.
Anna is certain that (L) is a tautology, and is thus true. However,
her logic professor tells her that before she began the exam, she was
slipped a reason distorting drug that impairs one’s ability to solve
logic problems; those who are affected by the drug only reach the
right conclusions % of the time. As it turns out, unbeknownst to
Anna, the drug was a placebo and Anna’s logic reasoning abilities
were not affected in the least.
What should Anna believe? We are pulled in two directions by reflecting on
different aspects of epistemic rationality. On the one hand, consider
Probabilism: An agent’s credences ought to be probabilistically coherent.
Probabilism demands that Anna’s credence in (L) be .
On the other hand, consider,
See Christensen (, ) for similar cases.
Influential defenses of Probabilism include Skyrms (), De Finetti (), Christensen
(), Joyce (), and Pettigrew ().

Calibrationism: For any proposition, p, if a rational agent forms a credence
in p on the basis of some first-order reasoning, and if, independently
of the first-order reasoning in question, that agent’s expected degree of
reliability concerning whether p is r, then the agent’s credence in p ought
to be r.
Anna should expect her degree of reliability concerning (L) to be .. By Cali-
brationism, then, Anna’s credence in (L) should be .
Thus, agents like Anna are subject to epistemic rules that cannot be
jointly satisfied, opening up the question what epistemic rationality requires
of them.
Such situations of conflict need not be this far-fetched. Here is a different
case lifted, with some modifications, from Knoks ():
implicit bias. Suppose that there are two kinds of people, circles and
squares. Sammy is a square. She’s been exposed to evidence that
very strongly suggests that almost all squares harbor an implicit bias
which causes them to believe, incorrectly, that circles are far ruder
than they really are. Sammy meets a circle, Carl, and judges them
rude on the basis of several personal interactions. Unbeknownst to
Sammy, though, she is unusual in that she doesn’t suffer from this
particular implicit bias.
Sammy’s interactions with Carl provide her with great evidence that they are
rude. However, she also has higher-order evidence to the effect that she has
likely misjudged the evidence regarding Carl’s impoliteness.
Sammy faces a conflict between two other seemingly plausible epistemic
principles:
Evidential Support: If an agent’s evidence strongly supports believing p, then
they ought to believe p.
Interlevel Coherence: A rational agent ought to be such that (i) if they believe
that their evidence supports believing p, then they ought to believe p
Influential defenses of Calibrationism include Roush (),White (), Sliwa and
Horowitz (), and Christensen (). While Calibrationists disagree about how exactly
this principle should be formulated, the consensus is that Anna’s credence in (L) should be ..
Some (e.g., Stapleford and McCain ()) reject Evidential Support in favor of a weaker
principle according to which you are only required to believe what your evidence strongly
supports if you have actually taken an attitude towards p. The conflict can be captured in
terms of this principle too, since we can stipulate that Sammy has considered whether Carl is
rude.

and (ii) if they believe that their evidence does not support believing p,
then they ought not believe p.
Evidential Support entails that Sammy should believe that Carl is rude. How-
ever, because she has good reason to think that she suffers from implicit biases,
this principle also entails that Sammy should believe that the evidence does not
support her belief that Carl is rude. On the basis of this, Interlevel Coherence
requires her to not believe that Carl is rude. Like Anna, then, Sammy is
subject to normative epistemic constraints that cannot be jointly satisfied.
The general question behind these puzzles is: what does epistemic ratio-
nality require us to think when its constraints are jointly unsatisfiable? Our
goal in this paper is to develop an answer to this question according to which,
in situations of conflict, epistemic rationality is indeterminate. When one is
subject to conflicting epistemic rules, it is indeterminate which rules one is
permitted and required to satisfy, and thus indeterminate which doxastic atti-
tudes one is permitted and required to have. To meet our goal, we are going to
argue for two main claims. First, that rational indeterminacy can be modelled
within the framework of defeasible deontic logic, as proposed by Horty (,
) and then applied to epistemic conflicts by Knoks (a,b). We show
that the detour through this logical framework is essential to spelling out the
view in full generality. Second, that this approach provides a unified way of
treating epistemic conflicts while also enjoying some important advantages
over its rivals.
Here is the plan. In section , we informally characterize three different
approaches to epistemic conflicts. In section , we model each approach in
our preferred deontic logic — a slight variant of Knoks’s system. In sections 
and , we offer some new reasons for preferring our view to its rivals. Finally,
in section , we compare our way of modelling rational indeterminacy to a
We are assuming that Sammy has good reason to think that her implicit biases cause
her to be so wrong in her initial assessment of Carl’s rudeness that she should think that her
evidence does not actually support the claim that Carl is rude.
Similar cases are discussed in Littlejohn (), Worsnip () and Lasonen-Aarnio
().
Other epistemic conflicts are discussed in Conee (), Sorensen (), Egan and Elga
(), Caie (, ), and Schechter ().

simpler supervaluationist treatment developed in Leonard ().
 Three approaches to epistemic dilemmas
In this section we provide a brief, informal overview of three possible answers
to our central question. The approaches agree that in situations of conflict
rational agents are not doomed to violate one of their epistemic requirements.
At this stage — prior to the technical development of section — we focus on
the general motivation of each proposal, rather than on any precise statement.
We start with a permissivist position.
Choice. When there are multiple epistemic rules that cannot be jointly satis-
fied, one is permitted but not required to satisfy any maximally satisfiable
combination of them.
In other words, rationality is permissive in the sense that one is free to adopt
any sufficiently strong combination of rules to satisfy, as long as they satisfy
one of them.
According to the second view, the rules of rationality are structured by
priority relations. When the rules conflict, one is required to satisfy a subset
of them that includes the highest ranking ones, if there are any, and perhaps
some others.
Priority. Rules do not have equal weight. When multiple rules cannot be
jointly satisfied, priority relations between them contribute to the deter-
mination of the final epistemic oughts.
For instance, if the demands of one’s first order evidence conflict with the
demands of one’s higher-order evidence, and if Evidential Support is given
more weight than Inter-Level Coherence, then one is required to believe what
their first-order evidence supports. Depending on the priority structure, there
might not be a highest ranking option, in which case one would determine
the final epistemic oughts on the basis of those rules that are not defeated by
For a fourth position according to which one can be subject to epistemic requirements
that cannot be jointly satisfied, see, e.g., Priest (), Ross (), Brouwer (), Hughes
(), and, on one interpretation, Christensen (, ). And see Horty () for one
way of formally modeling this approach. Finally, see, Caie (), Turri (), Lasonen-
Aarnio (), and Leonard () for some recent objections to this view. Because adequately
engaging with this position would take us beyond the scope of this paper, we will set it aside.
See, e.g., (Knoks, b, §).
See, e.g., (Knoks, b, §) and, on one interpretation, Christensen (, ).

anything else. It is worth noting that in this kind of case, one might consider
blending a priority based picture with a permissivist one.
Lastly, there is the option that conflicting epistemic rules give rise to
normative indeterminacy.
Indeterminacy. When there are multiple epistemic rules that cannot be jointly
satisfied, it is indeterminate which maximally consistent combination
one is permitted or required to satisfy. One is, however, determinately re-
quired to satisfy the disjunction of maximally consistent combinations.
Thus if two rules are in conflict, it is indeterminate whether one is permitted
and required to satisfy the first, and it is indeterminate whether one is per-
mitted and required to satisfy the second. Nevertheless, one is determinately
required to satisfy one or the other.
It is important to appreciate some subtleties when comparing Indeter-
minacy to the alternatives. Indeterminacy shares with Choice the idea that
one is determinately required to satisfy one of the conflicting rule-sets. Inde-
terminacy, however, stops short of declaring it permissible to satisfy any one
combination. Furthermore, the normative indeterminacy position is compat-
ible with the central contention of the Priority-based theorist, i.e., that rules
can be assigned various weights.
With these informal characterizations in hand, we are now going to
highlight how each one can be formally modeled.
 Formal analysis
Our preferred model is a relatively small reinterpretation and modification of
Knoks’ (b) formalism. Exploring the details of Knoks’s system serves two
purposes. First, the model offers an explanation of how epistemic requirements
and permissions are generated from the rules of rationality. For instnace,
instead of treating Evidential Support and Interlevel Coherence as indefeasible
rules that one is always required to satisfy, this model treats them as defeasible
rules that contribute to the final determination of what rational agents are
epistemically permitted and required to think, i.e., these defeasible rules
ground the selection of binding epistemic principles, but they need not be
identical with them. The second reason for exploring this model is that it
frames one of our main contributions—the formal modeling of a sophisticated
indeterminacy-friendly position.
See, e.g., Leonard ().

. The language
At the beginning of our analysis, we consider a language with the following
primitive grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | (ϕ ∧ϕ) | ©ϕ | b ϕ | !(ϕ | ϕ) | ϕ⇒ ϕ,
Informally, this adds three operators to a basic sentential language: ‘©’
is an operator tracking the epistemic requirement the agent is bound by; ‘ b ’
is a belief operator. Next, ‘!’ is a binary operator that expresses conditional
rules. In the defeasible frameworks of Horty (, ), which Knoks builds
on, requirements and permissions emerge from rules. The process involves a
series of devices whose job is to individuate which rules are to prevail, once
we take into account their compatibility and priority relations. The syntax of
‘!’ is vaguely reminiscent of the syntax of a conditional probability operator.
In particular, in the expression ‘!(ϕ | ψ), ψ is a condition under which the rule
with content ϕ is triggered. Lastly, ‘⇒’ denotes a support relation, holding
between a body of evidence (modeled as a set of propositons) and an individual
propositions. Although we generally follow Knoks’s system quite closely, our
construal of the support relation is a bit different from his. In Knoks’s system,
the relation denoted by ‘⇒’ links a proposition representing the evidence
and an attitude (e.g. a belief). We treat the evidence relation as relating the
evidence and a proposition. Informally, instead of saying that E supports
believing (the proposition expressed by) ϕ, we say that E supports ϕ. This
makes no difference to the formal analysis but makes our explanatory task a
bit simpler. Syntactically,⇒ is like a standard conditional, an unlike our ‘!’
operator in having its first argument be the ‘antecedent’, so to speak, of the
support relation.
. Modeling
The first step in deploying this language consists in giving precise representa-
tions of the core epistemic rules from (Section ) above. In implicit bias, for
instance, Evidential Support amounts to:
ES. !( b ϕ | E⇒ ϕ)
Horty calls these defaults and Knoks calls these imperatives. We choose “rules” because we
judge it to be more descriptive than these options.

Formalizing the Interlevel Coherence rule involves facing an important choice
point. It is tempting and perhaps most elegant to formalize it as:
• !(¬ b ϕ | b (E; ϕ))
Informally: given the hypothesis that one believes that the evidence does not
support ϕ, there is reason to not believe ϕ. Instead of this formalization, Knoks
opts for fomralizing this as a rule with conditional content but no condition
of its own. Formally, this is represented by the rule having a tautological (>)
hypothesis, as in:
IL. !( b (E; ϕ) ⊃ ¬ b ϕ | >)
This says that there is unconditional (‘standing’ in Knoks’s terminology) reason
to not believe those propositions that one believes are not supported by the
evidence. The difference is subtle, but has important ramifications in the
modeling of the cases. Once again, we follow Knoks.
Sticking with implicit bias, let p be an atomic sentence of the object lan-
guage representing the proposition Carl is rude. Sammy’s evidential situation
can be represented as:
E1. E⇒ p
E2. E⇒ (E; p)
The evidence supports p and it supports the claim that the evidence does not
support p. Each of these specific evidential claims is matched by an important
instance of ES—one of the first-order proposition p and one for the higher-
order support claim E; p.
ESF. !( b p | E⇒ p)
ESH. !( b E; p | E⇒ (E; p))
Similarly instantiating IL yields:
IRI. !( b (E; p) ⊃ ¬ b p | >)
This completes the representation of the principles involved in implicit bias.

. Reasoning with the model
Knoks’s modeling work illuminates the problem of normative conflict at the
heart of epistemic dilemmas. In implicit bias, for instance, each of ESF and
ESH is conditional on some evidential condition which in fact holds in the
given situation. So ESF gives the agent reason to believe p and ESH gives her
reason to believe E; p. An agent who enters both these states will find herself
in conflict with IRI. And this brings us back to our key question: what are
agents required and permtted to believe in situations like these?
Our final task in this section is to show how Priority, Choice, and Inde-
terminacy can be implemented in the default logic framework. The idea is
that each position is associated with a different way of generating epistemic
requirements and permissions from the epistemic rules that one is subject to
in a given context. Contexts here are understood as abstract representations of
the parameters that are relevant to the generation of epistemic requirements
from epistemic rules. We may think that each belief state is held against the
background of some information, as well as some salient epistemic principles.
Thus understood, this concept of context is foundationally distinct from oth-
erwise similar concepts of contexts philosophers of language might appeal
to.
Choice
The permissivist twist on the system — the Choice option — is a valuable
starting point. At this stage, a context c is modeled as a pair 〈W,R〉, where W
is a set of formulas representing the factual circumstances of a given situation,
while R is a set of rules. (Remember that rules are statements of the form
!(ψ | ϕ).) Given a rule, it is helpful to pick out its antecedent and consequent.
For example, if r =!(ψ | ϕ), Antecedent(r) = ϕ and Consequent(r) = ψ. These
functions are usefully polymorphic so that if R is a set of rules, Consequent(R)
is the set of consequents of the rules in R.
In our sample model of implicit bias, the context is pinned down by
letting W1 = {E1,E2}, while R1 = {ESF,ESH,IRI}. We make this official by
defining:
Context definition  c1=〈W1,R1〉.
We proceed to give a series of definitions that, given an arbitrary context
〈W,R〉 output the epistemic requirements that the agent is subject to in that

context. First, we identify the set of rules (from R) whose conditions are met in
the situation:
Triggered(c) = {r ∈ R |W |− Antecedent(r)}
A bit more precisely, but still informally, this definition distinguishes those
rules in R whose precondition is established by the factual information in W
from those whose precondition is not so established. To illustrate, imagine a
context in which one rule is to believe what Tweedledee says, and another rule
is to believe what Tweedledum says. Now imagine that only Tweedledee has
spoken, then the former rule but not the latter rule is triggered.
Let us turn our focus back on c1, our model of implicit bias. In this
artfully chosen scenario everything is triggered. That is:
T riggered(c1) = R1 = {ESF,ESH,IRI}
To see this, note that ESF is triggered by E1, ESH is triggered by E2 and IRI is
always triggered, because its precondition is a tautology. The set of conclusions
of all of these triggered rules is the inconsistent set:
{ b (p), b (E; p), [ b (E; p) ⊃ ¬ b (p)]}
The permissivist analysis generates epistemic oughts and permissions from
this set: ϕ is epistemically obligatory iff it follows from all of the subsets of
this set that are maximally consistent with W .
More formally, we provide the following chain of definitions.
Supported(c) = {ϕ ∈ L |ϕ ∈ Consequent(T riggered(c))}
MaxiconsX(Y ) = {Z ⊆ Y |X∪Z is consistent and ∀Z ′ ⊃ Z,X∪Z ′ is inconsistent}
Requirements(c) = {ϕ ∈ L | ∀X ∈MaxiConsW (Supported(c)),W ∪X |− ϕ}
In order: the supported sentences are the conclusions of triggered rules. Our
definition of maximal consistency is standard, with the exception of the fact
that it is relativized to a set of formulas X. Finally, and crucially, the epistemic
requirements in c are the maximally consistent (with respect to W ) sets of
supported formulas. It is possible to think of the last definition as implicitly
In this and the subsequent definitions, we implicitly assume that W and R on the right
side come from the context c on the left side, unless otherwise specified.

providing an analysis of an obligation operator © that draws on epistemic
requirements. The analysis is that©ϕ holds in c iff ϕ is a requirement in c.
Let us return to our example to see why this epistemic ought captures
the permissivist position. Note that the maximally consistent subsets of
T riggered(c1) are:
(i) b (p), b (E; p)
(ii) b (p), b (E; p) ⊃ ¬ b (p) (via modus tollens this reduces to ¬ b (E;
p)
(iii) b (E ; p), b (E ; p) ⊃ ¬ b (p) (via modus ponens this reduces to
¬ b (p))
These correspond to the following conjunctions (we’ll call these “takes” on the
problem):
T b (p)∧ b (E; p)
T b (p)∧¬ b (E; p)
T ¬ b (p)∧ b (E; p)
T corresponds to the fractured believer who disregards Interlevel Coherence.
T and T respectively disregard the second order evidence or the first order
evidence. According to the permissivist, none of the three takes on the problem
is epistemically required, but (as Knoks clarifies), their disjunction is.
• ¬© (T)∧¬© (T)∧¬© (T)
• ©(T∨T∨T)
Turning to permissions, recall that while Choice says that an agent is
required to be in a state that satisfies the disjunction of the three takes, they
are permitted to be in any of the three states. So, suppose we introduce a
permission operator, with the stipulation that Pϕ holds at c iff ¬©¬ϕ holds
at c. Then all of the following hold at c1:
• P [ b (p)∧ b (E; p)]
• P [ b (p)∧¬ b (E; p)]
• P [¬ b (p)∧ b (E; p)]
This completes our formal presentation of Choice.

Priority
Knoks (b) also shows the intervention that is required to model the
priority-based position. To take this step, we must enrich our conception
of contexts. Instead of taking contexts to be pairs consisting of factual infor-
mation and rules, we take them to be triples, by adding a priority component.
The idea is that we do not just list epistemic rules, but also articulate their
priority relations (again in the style of Horty (, )). As a result, in
this more sophisticated system, a context is a triple 〈W,R,≺〉, where ≺ is a
reflexive and transitive priority relation over rules. Intuitively r1 ≺ r2 iff r2
takes priority over r1. Note that the relation may be partial, so that there may
be incomparable rules.
Pinning down the epistemic requirements in these prioritized contexts
is a more complex task. First, identify the consistent rules in c — those rules
whose conclusions are compatible with the factual coordinate of c.
Consistent(c) = {r |Conclusion(r)∩W is consistent }
Next up, we identify the distinguished set of rules that are both triggered and
consistent.
Active(c) = {r | r ∈ T riggered(c)∩Consistent(c)}
Now let ρ be a variable ranging over sets of rules. We say that some rule r and a
set of rules ρ are conflicting in c if they are all active in c and have incompatible
conclusions.
Conflicted(c,ρ) = {r |Active(ρ)∧Consequent(ρ) |− ¬Consequent(r)}
For reasons related to our later development, it is convenient to present this as
a property of a rule r that is relativized to a set of rules ρ.
Finally, Knoks borrows from Horty (, ) the idea of extending
≺ to relate sets of rules, as well as individual rules. In particular, ρ  r means
that every rule in ρ has priority over r.
We can now state the central concept of the priority-based analysis. A
context may have several active rules, and those active rules may be in conflcit
with each other. However, only a specified subset of those rules will be binding
— that is, capable of generating epistemic requirements. These are those rules
that are not defeated by any set of rules. That is to say those rules r such that
there is no set ρ of conflicting rules that is uniformly of higher priority than r.

Binding(c) = {r | ¬∃ρ ⊆ R,Conf licted(c,ρ)∧ ρ  r}
With this concept in hand, we complete the analysis by replacing T riggered(c)
with Binding(c) in characterizing the epistemic requirements.
Requirements(c) = {ϕ |∀X ⊆MaxiCons(Consequent(Binding(c))),W ∪X |− ϕ}
The priority analysis, as reconstructed by Knoks, yields different recom-
mendations in implicit bias, depending on what kind of priority ordering is
assumed in the context.
To start, consider a context c2 that is like c1 in its first two coordinates
(W1 = {E1,E2}, R1 = {ESF,ESH,IRI}), with the additional information that the
priority ordering 1 is: ESF 1 ESH 1 IRI .
Context definition  c2 = 〈W1,R1,≺1〉
In c2, any one rule from R1 is conflicted relative to the pair consisting of the
other two rules, but not relative to either rule individually. However, ESF and
ESH are both binding. In the case of ESF, it is binding because nothing at all
takes priority over it. As for ESH , it is binding because, although ESF takes
priority over it, ESF isn’t conflicting with it. Only the set consisting of ESF
and IRI conflicts with ESH , and that set is not uniformly prioritized over ESH .
As a result the requirements in c2 are the consequences of the conclusions of
ESF and ESH—i.e. the consequences of b (p) and b (E; p).
We note here a slight problem for Knoks’s reconstruction of the priority
system and suggest a solution. The concept of a binding rule relies on the idea
of a set ρ of rules being better than a single rule r. As noted, Knoks obtains
this relation by letting ρ  r iff every member of ρ is uniformly prioritized
over r. This is problematic in some cases. Consider for example the context c3
defined as follows. Let the first two coordinates be as in c1 and c2; next define
a partial order ≺2 with ESF ≺2 ESH and IRI ≺2 ESH , but with ESF and IRI
incomparable with respect to each other.
Context definition  c3 = 〈W1,R2,≺2〉
The problem is that, under the current analysis, all three of ESH , ESF
and IRI are binding in c3. It is clear that ESH should be binding, since it has
priority over both of the other rules. But now consider ESF: ESF is not defeated
by ESH alone since it is compatible with it. It could potentially be defeated by
the set {ESH,IRI}, but that set contains an element, IRI , that is not better than

ESF, so ESF is not defeated by any set that is uniformly better than it. For
that reason the set of binding rules in c3 is the entire set {ESF,ESH,IRI}. The
upshot is that the ordering ≺2 produces the same predictions as the ordering
according to which all three rules are incomparable. The fact that ESH has
priority over both ESF and IRI is washed out in the calculation. This shows up
in the prediction that the system makes. For instance, it makes the implausible
prediction that the agent is permitted to violate ESH .
A simple fix would be to modify how we extend the priority relations
from individual rules to relations between sets of rules. In particular, when ρ
is a set and r is an individual rule, we can say that ρ  r iff for every s ∈ ρ, s  r
and for some s ∈ ρ, s  r. The effect of this change on the example involving
c3 is apparent and significant. As a result of it, the only binding rule in c3 is
ESH , and the epistemic requirements our agent is under arise by considering
what follows from {ESH}. In sum, the agent ought to believe that the evidence
doesn’t support p but is under no obligation with respect to rule enjoining
them to believe p itself or the higher-order constraint b (E; p) ⊃ ¬ b p.
Indeterminacy
The indeterminacy approach can be viewed as a generalization of the priority
approach to a situation in which the context constrains, but does not fix, a
priority structure.
Now, there are a few strategically diverging ways of presenting an in-
determinacy based position. Consider again c3. One basic thought is that
this context determines that there are two sets of requirements that are not
ruled out as binding. One set is {ESH,ESF} and the other set is {ESH,IRI}.
The priority ordering leaves indeterminate how ESF and IRI are to be ranked
against each other.
We think of sets like {ESH,ESF} as ways of resolving the indeterminacy
in the priority ordering. To use a single word, we think of them as resolu-
tions and we are going to construct them in two stages. First, we collect the
maximally consistent sets of conclusions of binding rules: we call these the
“proto-resolutions”. Then, we form all the maximally consistent sets of conclu-
sions of triggered rules that are compatible with some proto-resolution.
There are a couple more complicated fixes one could think about. First, one might
conceive of a system in which priorities have individual numerical weight, and then there is
a module of the theory whose job is to extend that numerical weight from individual rules
to sets of rules. Another option—one that stays within the qualitative framework of Knoks’s
analysis—is to adopt the replacement-based analysis in (Horty, , ch.).

Proto-resolutions(c) = {X |X ∈MaxiConsW (Consequent(Binding(c)))}
Resolutions(c) = {X | ∃Y ∈ P roto − resolutions(c),Y ⊆ X
and X ∈MaxiConsW (Consequent(T riggered(c)))}
So in our example, there is one proto-resolution, namely {ESH}. However,
corresponding to it, there are two resolutions: {ESH,ESF} and {ESH,IRI}. The
distinction between proto-resolutions and full resolutions gives our theory a
richer set of predictions which we won’t explore until the last section of this
paper.
Next up, we relativize requirements and permissions to a resolution.
RequirementsX(c) = {ϕ |W ∪X |− ϕ}
PermittedX(c) = {ϕ | ¬ϕ < RequirementsX(c)}
Technically, of course, we have only relativized to a set of formulas X but in
practice we think of these as resolutions of the indeterminacy.
Ultimately, it is desirable to have an unrelativized concept. We do this by
characterizing the determinate requirements—those sentences which all of the
individual resolutions uniformly agree about. These are obtained by closing
off the relativization by quantifying universally.
Determinate Requirements(c) =
{ϕ | ∀X ∈ Resolutions(c),ϕ ∈ RequirementsX(c)}
Determinate Permissions(c) =
{ϕ | ∀X ∈ Resolutions(c),¬ϕ < RequirementsX(c)}
More generally we say that given a relativized condition ΘX(c), we have that
Det(Θ(c)) iff ∀X ∈ Resolutions(c),ΘX(c).
Those sentences that are required (/permitted) relative to some, but not
all resolutions, are indeterminately required (/permitted).
Indeterminate Requirements(c) = {ϕ | ∃X,Y ∈ Resolutions(c),
ϕ ∈ RequirementsX(c)∧ϕ < RequirementsY (c)}
Indeterminate Permissions(c) = {ϕ | ∃X,Y ∈ Resolutions(c),
ϕ ∈ P ermittedX(c)∧ϕ < P ermittedY (c)}

The indeterminist twist on the formalism is sensitive to differences in
priority orderings. In a context like c2 it will simply agree with Knoks’s analysis.
But its true force shines through when we consider a context in which the three
rules have equal strength. In this kind of context, Indeterminacy makes a
different recommendation from Choice, and also from Priority (which in this
case just agrees with Choice).
Go back to our three takes from the analysis of the permissivist position:
T b (p)∧ b (E; p)
T b (p)∧¬ b (E; p)
T ¬ b (p)∧ b (E; p)
Naturally, what turns out to be required on this approach depends significantly
on the priority ordering.
Start by considering an ordering such that the three rules have equal
priority. Then all three rules ESF,ESH and IRI are binding. Accordingly, we
have three resolutions {ESF,ESH}, {ESF,IRI} and {ESH,IRI}—respectively
supporting one each of T,T, and T. So for each one of our three takes it’s
indeterminate whether the agent ought to be in that state, but it is determinate
that one ought to be in a state which satisfies the disjunction of T,T, and
T. While the view agrees with Choice on this score, it denies that one is
determinately permitted to be in a state satisfying T (and similarly for T,
and T.)
Because we have added the indeterminacy module on top of a priority-
based system, we are also able to coherently model those cases in which there
is a priority ranking. Thus, consider again the hypothetical context with
ESF  ESH  IRI . In this context, the only binding resolution is {ESF,ESH}.
Thus, insofar as this really is how these rules should be ranked, it is determinate
that one ought to satisfy T.
 Objections to Choice
The permissivist option, Choice, rests on an extreme form of intrapersonal
permissivism. It can be permissible for one agent, with one relatively rich body
of evidence and a single evidential standard (i.e., a way of weighing various
pieces of evidence against each other), who is subject to one set of moral and
practical stakes, to adopt one of a huge swath of credence levels in a particular
proposition at a particular time.

In logic problem, for instance, Choice says that even if everything is held
fixed (e.g., stakes, evidence, Anna’s evidential standards, time, etc.), Anna is
still permitted to be certain that (L) is true, and she is also permitted to be 
percent certain that it is false.
Insofar as rationality has something to do with proportioning your doxas-
tic attitudes to your evidence, Extreme Intrapersonal Permissivism is a tough
pill to swallow. Once everything is held fixed, the more Anna’s evidence and
evidential standards point towards (L) being true, the more they should point
towards not-(L) being false. Thus, if Anna’s evidence and evidential standards
are such that Anna is permitted to have a very high credence in (L), they should
also be such that Anna is not permitted to also have a very low credence in
(L). But if Choice is true, then Anna’s evidence and evidential standards point
towards (L) being certainly true even though they also point towards (L) being
almost certainly false. Thus, even if rationality is somewhat permissive in
general, the first challenge for Choice is to explain how it can be so extremely
permissive in particular.
Even if rationality turns out to be extremely permissive, though, the
second worry for Choice is that it licenses agents to reason in problematic ways.
In implicit bias, for instance, recall that Choice permits Sally have any of these
three combinations of attitudes:
T b (p)∧ b (E; p)
T b (p)∧¬ b (E; p)
T ¬ b (p)∧ b (E; p)
Thus, Choice permits Sally to believe that Carl is rude and that her
evidence does not actually support this (i.e.,"take "). But from Sally’s own
perspective, it is reasonable to ask: why is the evidence pointing away from
what she believes? That is, why should Sally continue to believe that Carl is
This objection leverages the standard claim (see e.g. White ) that evidence cannot
point towards p while also pointing towards not-p. It is also worth noting that there are far
less extreme versions of Intrapersonal Permissivism that do not run into the problem we are
raising here. For instance, Jackson (forthcoming) defends a moderate version of Intrapersonal
Permissivism according to which one agent, with one body of evidence and one evidential
standard can be permitted to believe p in a low stakes case and suspend judgment about p in a
high stakes case. Thus, unlike Extreme Intrapersonal Permissivism, Jackson has an explanation
for why belief and suspension of judgment can both be permissible even though one’s evidence
and evidential standards remain the same: the stakes have changed drastically. Because
Extreme Intrapersonal Permissivism permits agents to have radically different attitudes even
though everything is held fixed, explanations like this one are not available.

rude when, by her own lights, her evidence does not support this? From Sally’s
point of view, the best explanation seems to be that the evidence is misleading.
After all, if it really was pointing towards the truth, then Sally should follow the
evidence where it leads and not believe that Carl is rude. Thus, by permitting
Sally to have this combination of attitudes, Choice also licenses Sally to infer
that her evidence is misleading. But no theory of rationality should license an
agent to bootstrap her way to the conclusion that her evidence is misleading in
this way (Horowitz, ).
Similarly, Choice permits Sally to believe that Carl is rude while also
refusing to believe that her evidence does not actually support this (i.e., "Take
"). While this might not seem problematic initially, recall that Sally has taken
many implicit bias tests which give her good reason to think that her evidence
does not actually support the claim that Carl is rude. From Sally’s own per-
spective, then, why ignore these test results? After all, if Sally should take
these results into account, then she should think that her evidence does not
actually suggest that Carl has been impolite. From Sally’s own perspective,
the best explanation here seems to be that her implicit biases did not impact
her judgment about Carl’s rudeness. Thus, by permitting Sally to have this
combination of attitudes, Choice licenses Sally to reason her way to the conclu-
sion that she was immune from the effects of her implicit biases while she was
interacting with Carl. But no theory of rationality should license an agent to
form beliefs about their own psychology in this way.
Thus, proponents of Choice face two challenges. They must explain how
rationality can be so extremely permissive, and also that such a permissive view
does not license agents to reason in problematic ways. Neither challenge seems
easy to meet, and both are avoided by Indeterminacy, which suggests that
(in a case with the right structure) neither of these attitudes is determinately
permissible, but at best indeterminately so.
 Objections to priority
According to Priority, whenever the rules of rationality conflict, some consistent
subset, identified on the basis of priority relations, must be privileged over
the others. But how and why do the rules get ranked in a particular way?
In implicit bias, for instance, what sorts of facts are such that Evidential
Support gets assigned more (or less) importance than Inter-Level Coherence?
Proponents of Priority must explain how conflicting epistemic rules get ranked

such that an agent is always permitted and required to satisfy one rule in
particular.
Knoks (b) suggests that cases like implicit bias are under-described
and that once a complete description is given, we can rely on the context to
determine how much weight to give to each rule. For instance, once we know
more about (i) Sammy’s evidence for thinking that Carl is rude (e.g., how often
they have interacted and what have those interactions have been like) (ii) how
much evidence Sammy has regarding her own implicit biases and (iii) how
much Sammy cares about acquiring true beliefs and avoiding error, then we
will have the contextual information needed to know exactly how Evidential
Support stacks up against Inter-Level Coherence.
A problem with this response is that, while contextual information might
reveal how certain rules get ranked in some cases, context alone won’t establish
clear rankings in every case. Imagine, for instance, that Sammy has interacted
with Carl three times. During the first interaction, it seemed to Sammy that
Carl did not sincerely thank her for holding the door. During the second
interaction, it seemed to Sammy that Carl didn’t greet her after she waived
hello. During the third interaction, Sammy noticed that Carl did not RSVP to
her party invitation. Moreover, because she has taken a wide variety of implicit
bias tests, Sammy knows that she is likely to misjudge Carl’s behavior as being
rude  percent of the time. Finally, Sammy values acquiring true beliefs and
avoiding error to the same degree. Given this contextual information, should
Evidential Support be given more weight than Inter-Level Coherence such that
Sammy should believe that Carl is rude? Or should it be given less weight such
that Sammy should not believe that Carl is rude? To our mind, the context
alone doesn’t provide definitive insight.
Things seem even less clear in logic problem. Here it is stipulated that
Anna is justified in thinking that there is exactly a  percent chance that
she has arrived at the right answer about (L). It is also stipulated that (L) is a
tautology. And let us suppose that Anna cares as much about having accurate
credences as she does about avoiding inaccurate ones. Even so, this contextual
information alone does not seems to shed much light on whether Probabilism
should get more weight than Calibrationism (in which case Anna should be
certain that (L) is true), or whether it should be the other way around (in which
case Anna’s credence in (L) should be .).
The challenge of establishing clear priority rankings will also be difficult
to meet, and it too is avoided by Indeterminacy, which says that in these cases,

there is no determinate fact of the matter about how the priority rankings get
established.
 Comparing two types of indeterminist theories
Indeterminacy provides a unified way of treating epistemic conflicts while also
avoiding the worries discussed above. This is a good reason to prefer it to its
rivals.
However, one important consequence of this paper is that there are many
different ways of spelling out the Indeterminacy position. Knoks’s work shows
that it is important to attend to the distinction between rule schemas (such
as the general support principle ES) and rule instances (such as the ESF and
ESH). Similarly, in developing an indeterminacy-friendly position, we face a
choice point concerning whether to think of resolutions of the indeterminacy
in terms of schemas or instances. Leonard () is naturally read as thinking
of indeterminacy as between two norm-schemas. Our present analysis of the
Indeterminacy position treats the indeterminacy as relating specific instances.
Thus we may have a context whose ordering is ESH ≺ IRI ≺ ESF where
the two instances of the Evidential Support rule are separated in terms of
their priority. In such a context, the resolution that generates the salient
requirements is {ESF,IRI}. This is not an expressible resolution within a
rule-schemas framework.
This is not to say that the approach that centers on rule schemas is
obviously incorrect. There might be conceptual reasons to think that priority
relations should hold between general rules and not their specific instances.
Some may even feel that there is something incoherent-seeming about saying
that the evidential support requirements have higher priority when they are
applied to higher order claims about support relations, than they do when
applied about specific propositions.
Be all that as it may, the approach in which priority relations hold be-
tween instances of rules is strictly more expressive. For this reason, we find it
preferable.
In addition to this conceptual point, the Indeterminacy framework we
built on the foundation of Knoks’s system has modeling potential that is simply
absent from a plain supervaluationist treatment of Indeterminacy. For one
thing, our system allows for priority relations over rules, which leaves open the
possibility that cases of conflicts can be resolved by some rules taking priority
over others.

Of course, the flat-footed supervaluationist could reach out for a priority
relation among epistemic rules, and then claim that one ought to supervaluate
only over those rules that are not defeated. This move just incorporates within
the supervaluationist story some key elements of our framework.
But while this maneuver would get them closer to our theory, there are
still important outstanding differences. Consider this example:
The Brando family follows the advice of three authorities: an aca-
demic expert, a priest for their religion, and their fitness coach. The
Brandos view all of these authorities as reliable, but they view the
academic and the priest as most reliable, and the tennis coach as
slightly less reliable.
Imagine now that the academic expert and the religious expert
disagree on some issue: the academic expert says that masks help
avoid certain infections; the priest says that they do not; the fitness
coach says that purple masks help.
To model this situation, let ra, rp and rf (respectively for “academic”, “priest”
and “fitness”) be three rules corresponding to the three sources of authority.
We suppose that ra and rp have priority over rf but are incomparable with
respect to each other. In this case, a supervaluationist account enriched with
priorities would reason as follows: rf is defeated by rp, so the undefeated rules
are the members of the set {ra, rp}. These are conflicting, and so we have to
consider the two resolutions {ra} and {rp}. The believer faces a tension between
the claim that masks help and the conflicting claim that they do not.
This is progress, but it gets an important modeling detail wrong. Ideally,
we would like the resolution that agrees with the academic to also be bolstered
by the fitness coach’s opinion. After all, this opinion was defeated by the priest,
but when we think from the perspective of the academic expert, the priest’s
opinion is defeated. In other words, instead of a resolutions with ra as its only
member, we would like there to be a resolution corresponding to {ra, rf }.
Our system allows us to retrieve this distinction because of our distinc-
tion between proto-resolutions and resolutions. In the example, our proto-
resolutions are {rf } and {rp}. But as we move from proto-resolutions to resolu-
tions, {rf } gets augmented with ra. As a result, we end up with {ra, rf } and {rp}
as resolutions, just as we had hoped.
Our mechanism for turning proto-resolutions into resolutions is not per-
fect, and will itself need refinement in the face of even more complex problems.

Our point here is not that we have landed on the ultimate implementation of
the idneterminacy position. Instead our point is that the default framework has
the appropriate flexibility and expressive potential to capture a sophisticated
version of the view that there is normative indeterminacy in the epistemic
domain.
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